This is an overview of the career of the sociologist Jeffrey C Alexander plus an alternative approach including the George Mason research program.
For several decades Alexander (1947 - ) has been very much a man at work to advance sociology as an academic discipline and a handmaiden of left liberal social reform. He took a BA from Harvard in the 1960s and moved to the University of California for doctoral studies. Despite being a committed Marxist he made a serious study of Talcott Parsons on advice from a radical teacher who assured him that there was need to take account of the Talcott Parsons system of sociological theory.
He picked up the post-positivist philosophy of science from Polanyi, Kuhn, Hanson, Koyre and others, then embarked on a review of the contributions of Marx, Durkheim, Weber and Parsons. From that platform he moved on to be a leading light in a movement that he christenened “neofunctionalism”, part of the “third phase” of postwar Western sociology. At last report he has moved on to the strong program in cultural theory.
The overview of Alexander’s career is based on selected items from a very large list.
The selected items are:
The Introduction to a 1985 book “Neofunctionalism”, edited by Alexander, that launched neofunctionalism as the “third phase” of postwar sociological thinking
A 1990 paper with Paul Colomy. ‘Neofunctionalism Today: Reconstructing a Theoretical Tradition’ which argued that neofunctionalism was delivering on its promisory notes.
A 2001 Editor’s Introduction to a multivolume collection of readings Mainstream and Critical Social Theory: Classical, Modern and Contemporary.
Theoretical logic and the masters of sociology
His first major work was a four-volume set of books collectively titled Theoretical Logic in Sociology. The first volume explored the implications of the post-positivist philosophy of science with special attention to the fundamental presuppositions of a metaphysical nature that guide and shape the thought processes at all levels of intellectual activity. Many inconsistencies and strains in sociological theories can be traced to unresolved issues at the presuppositional level. He also disaggregated the levels of theoretical analysis to generate a continuum with metaphysical presuppositions at one end and obesrvation statements at the other. The aim was to counter a number of damaging errors of thought which inhibit or distort both the creative and the critical phases of theoretical work. Chief among these is an error which he called conflationism, which means neglecting the multiple levels of analysis and picking out one (perhaps the ideological orientation) as the “essential” level to focus critical attention. Armed with multidimensional criteria for appraisal he then proceeded to analyse the strengths and weaknesses Marx, Durkheim, Weber and Parsons, the four men who he regarded as the masters of sociology.
The four volumes in the series appeared in 1982 and 1983 and contributed to the rise of a movement called neofunctionalism.
Neofunctionalism
Alexander wrote the Introduction to Neofunctionalism (1985) signalling that the tide against Talcott Parsons had turned and his legacy if not the whole of his system was being revived. He noted that functionalism was not a very good word to describe Parsons’ theory, certainly not the action theory of The Structure of Social Action. The term came from a study group on systems theory convened by L J Henderson at Harvard in the 1930s. Henderson was working under the influence of Pareto and biological functionalism, especially Canon’s exposition in The Wisdom of the Body of “homeostastis”, the control of temperature and other physiological states of the human body. This kind of systems theory is focussed on the mechanisms that are used to maintain the integrity of the system, especially feedback mechanisms that tend to maintain an equilibrium state. Parsons, Homans, Merton and other sociologists were exposed to this influence, either directly in the seminar or by contact with Henderson and the other attendees.
For Alexander, functionalism is best regarded as a tradition with six elements which are not unique to it but are unique in combination. They are (1) a model of society as an intelligible system, (2) concentrating on action as much as on structure, (3) concerned with integration and also deviance and conflict as possibilities, (4) posits distinctions between personalitiy, culture and society with central importance attached to socialization, (5) recognition of differention as a mode of social change and (6) independence of conceptaulization and theorising from other levels of sociological analysis.
This tradition fell into disprepute during the 1960s and by the mid 1970s the (mostly) radical criticisms “had crystallized into a conventional wisdom that froze the functionalist image in time”, unfortunately (in his view) just as progressive delelopment of the the later period of Parsons theoretical development could have been under way. However the innovators in the profession pursued other avenues such as symbolic interaction and conflict theory. Alexander did not mention this but the 70s were a bad time for sociology and some other fields as radicals ran wild on the campuses, while standards of scholarship, civility and rationality went out the window. This was the time when a senior sociologist in Australia wrote a letter to the local journal announcing that he would cease attending the annual conference of the Association because he was sick of being shouted at by junior staff and students.
Eventually a new wave of theorists became active who did not feel a need for either ritualistic abuse or defence of the Parsonian opus. They were prepared to appropriate elements and move on. This wave is represented by the contributors to this volume, all prepared to work with functionalism (loosely defined) in a nuanced and multidimensional manner.
The ideological residue of the 70s persists and Alexander noted that virtually every contributor pushes functionalism to the left, as he did himself. Also, virtually every contributor is a conflict theorist (possibly another residue of the 70s which would appear to violate the stricture against conflation!).
He concluded:
“No one knows where such developments will lead, whether a neofunctional school will emerge, or whether, instead, neofunctionalism will shape contemporary sociology in less conspicuous ways. In the past Parsons’ controversial reputation meant that even some of the participants in this revival were loath to acknowledge his influence. The appearance of this and other recent publications seems to indicate that this period is over. The moveent to reappropriate Parsons in a neofunctional way is gaining momentum. Whether is is simply old wine in new bottles, or a new brew, is something history will decide.”
Neofunctionalism delivers
In 1990 Alexander and Colomy wrote a paper titled ‘Neofunctionalism Today: Reconstructing a Theoretical Tradition’ to demonstrate that neofunctionalism was “delivering on its promisory notes” because it had become “a field of intense theoretical discourse and growing empirical investigations”. It achieved this status by a process of reconstruction of an earlier tradition, a process that is distinct from the less critical and creative activites of extension and revision in that it involves (a) acknowledging failings in the earlier tradition and (b) incorporating elements of rival traditions.
They focussed on the discourses and research programs which place neofunctionalism in the third phase of postwar Western sociology. They argued that a process of reconstruction had been put in train to permit neofunctionalism to address areas of weakness in the theories of the first two phases.
First phase, to the 1960s. During this time they suggest that structural-functionalism a la Parsons and Merton dominated the field, or at least was the dominant influence. This approach was supposed to unite the “warring schools” of sociology within a framework
that was roomy enough for all of them, with a methodology that harmonised the roles of theory and data.
Second phase, 60s to 80s. The reaction took various forms, some driven by internal factors where various schools of microsociology aimed to “set contingent action against social structures in the name of creativity and individual freedom”. Conflict theorists in macrosociology pressed the role of material foroces (especially economic conflict and inequality) as the drivers of social processes. Other forces acted from the outside, especially the radicalisation of social sciences and the humanities.
Third phase, 80s. Alexander and Colomy describe this as a move back to synthesis. They worked through a list of schools to indicate the moving spirits in each case: symbolic interactionism (Blumer, Goffman), the exchange tradition (Coleman, Goode, Blau), ethnomethodology (Cicourel). hey noted that cultural studies had become a growth area and cultural sociology was the most recent section of the American Sociological Association. In general theory they note the same tendency to moved on from the “one-sided polemics of earlier theoretical work” with reference to Giddens, Collins and Habermas.
The third phase has given Parsons new relevance because of the wide range of his theoretical efforts, demonstrated in the compliment paid by Habermas who tried to incorporate some elements of the Parsonian scheme. They also see the influence of Parsons in the rise of cultural studies. Three of the key elements of the third phase can be seen in the earlier work of Parsons, (1) the desire for theoretical synthesis, (2)
the new attempt to theorise culture and (3) the changing (less radical) ideological environment of sociology.
Social Science as Discourse and Research Program
They describe progress in the social sciences in terms of competition between rival traditions which are distinguished by their relatively stable “cores” of presuppositional assumptions and by the bodies of research which they sponsor. They suggest that changes in the more peripheral areas around the cores tend to proceed along two lines - elaboration and revision, each of which claim to preserve the original insights of the founding fathers. That is obvious in the work of extension while the work of revision tends to be more defensive. A third kind of development is less common but more interesting because it involves changes at the core. They call this reconstruction and it differs from elaboration and revision because (a) differences with the founder are clearly signalled and (b) elements may be incorporated from other traditions. A fourth development is the destruction of a tradition, not because it is falsified in a positivist manner but because it “become deligitimisedin the eyes of the scientific community” as a result of “broad shifts in the disciplinary community’s ’scientific sensibility’”. The tradition may not actually disappear, it can become latent so it may be picked up again if times change in some appropriate manner.
They suggested that functionalism enjoyed a period of elaboration and revision during the first postwar phase, then became latent during the second phase and has been reborn in a different guise as neofunctionalism in the third phase. The discussed these changes with reference to two basic genres, generalised discourse and research programs.
Discourse
“By generalized discourse, we refer to discussions that argue about presuppositions, about ontology and epistemology, about the ideological and metaphysical implications of sociological argument, and about its broad historical grounding. Within the context of research progrms, by contrast, such generalized issues are assumed to be relatively unproblematic. What becomes problematic, what propels this mode of scientific activity, is the need to provide interpretations or explanations of specific empirical structures and processes”.
The generalized discourse of neofunctionalism is essentially the ongoing reconstruction of the core of the Parsonian tradition (the Parsons program if you like). Alexander made a major contribution to this task with the fourth (Parsons) volume of his Theoretical Logic in Sociology. Neofunctionalism emerged from the reconstructed core, marking a departure from the elaboration of the program during the first postwar phase and the “deconstruction” that occurred during the second phase. [My own view on this is that the way forward was to start with the action frame of reference as it stood in 1937 and make connections Popper’s “situational analysis” and the praxeology of the Austrian school (Mises and Hayek). Instead, Alexander did his best to make sense of the AGIL “pattern variable” scheme that Parsons developed in the “middle period” of his work, and also additional refinements and complications in the latter part of his career.]
The work of reconstruction involved a great deal of attention to the ideological implications of the Parsons program. For those who accept the dualism of facts and values (a la Weber, Mises and Popper) all that is beside the point. Alexander has argued for the generally progressive and humanistic thrust of Parsons’ work but he has also agreed with critics about some of its conservative features. They wrote “Alexander himself has sought to politicize functionalism and tie it to the normative issues of the day”, pushing neofunctionalism in a “left leaning but not radical direction”. Others take more radical positions, some in opposition to their perception of Parsons’ position and others reading radical possibilities into it. Holton and Turner offer a more balanced and nuanced appraisal of Parsons and the positions that he occupied at different times. In fact he probably occupied the same position all his adult life, in favour of freedom and social democracy. His support for the New Deal was an affront to free traders; he had no sympathy for communbism but he resisted McCarthyism (which affronted the rabid anti-communists) and his reformist position affronted the new radicals. Like another great social democrat, Karl Popper, with a better understanding of economics he could have been a minimum state or classical liberal.
Research
Neofunctionalism is more than generalized philosophical and methodological discourse, it also aims to sponsor research studies that cast light on the way the social world works. Theoretical work, empirical studies and praxis should proceed in concert. In Alexander’s view the most developed research programs sponsored by neofunctionalism could be found in the areas of social change, cultural studies, economic sociology, politics, mass communication, feminism and the sociology of the professions. Unfortunately he did not expand on the work in economic sociology and there was no mention of the problems of developing countries; these are two areas where comparison would be interesting with the George Mason research progarm which is sketched at the end of this paper.
There is more discussion of research programs in Alexander’s paper “Canons, Discourses and Research Programs: Plurality, Progress and Competition in Classical, Modern and Contemporary Sociology”, the Introduction to an eight volume anthology of classic selections. He suggested that sociological works will not become part of the canon unless they generate a series of onging research programs. He instanced Giddens as a writer who produced a body of theoretical work that has generated discourse but virtually no research, hence his theory is unlikely to be canonised. Perhaps the same could be said for Habermas and the Frankfurt School at large in recent times.
He suggested that the research topics that are generated by theoretical raditions are a triggered by one or other of (a) conflicts in the tradition itself, (b) competition with the empirical studies generated by opposing traditions and (c) practical issues generated by social change.He reported that the reseach was shifting direction, with less work in the previous main streams from Marx, Weber, Durkheim etc and more focus on emerging fields of interest related to identity and cultural issues such as gender politics, ethnicity, postcolonial studies, queer theory, Deep Green theory etc.
Finally ‘The Strong Program in Cultural Studies’ (2002). One interesting feature of this program is the way it draws on so many diverse schools of thought but not the two that I think are most robust and helpful.
AN ALTERNATIVE PROGRAM
An alternative program derives from some lines of thought that Alexander largely left out of account, namely the Austrian school of social and economic thought represented by Mises and the works of Karl Popper. It is interesting that Talcott Parsons in his early work was aligned with Mises and Popper, providing an alternative to positivism and historicism (an unhelpful bundle of anti-positivist theories) during the 1930s and 1940s - Mises with praxeology, Parsons with the action frame of reference and Popper with situational analysis. Some of this is described here.
Unfortunately the three principals and their followers worked in almost complete isolation from each other, so they achieve no synergy and failed to generate the critical mass that might hve made a significant difference in economics, sociology and the social sciences at large. The Austrian achool staged a revival during the 1970s but it still proceeds for the most part in isolation from the Popper and Parsons programs.
The program that is proposed will be a synthesis or merger of the Mises/Austrian line with the metaphysics and epistemology of Karl Popper (another Austrian) yielding what might be called the Even More Austrian school of economic and social thought. Given the dualism of facts and values people who work in this program will not be committed to any particular ideological position although most at present would be classical liberals with some on the Mises side leaning to libertarianism and some on the Popper side being social democrats. In contrast, the Alexander program followed a road from Marxism to left-liberalism.
Post positivism
The postpositivist philosophy of science that Alaxander sourced from the 1950s and 1960s should be traced further back with Popper’s work in the 1930s although the nature of his achievement is still being worked out due to the unhelpful way that the problems at stake have been formulated and debated in the intellectual climate dominated by positivism and empiricism, and by the the presupposition of “justificationism” - the quest for positively justified beliefs. Much the same applies to his work on the social sciences during the 1940s when he was working at what Alexander called the presuppositional level, especially in his critique of essentialism (which Alexander called conflationism). But again his contribution was obscured by the context of the debate and most readers focussed on more superficial aspects of the work, as though it was just a polemic against Plato, Hegel and Marx.
Popper’s anti-positivist program proceeded apace as he worked on The Postscript to The Logic of Scientific Discovey during the 1950s. He formulated his theory of metaphysical research programs and began to publish on the topic but the most helpful exposition remained in press until 1982 when it appeared as the Metaphysical Epilogue to a book on quantum physics.
The George Mason Research Program
Alexander suggested that powerful intellectual traditions should sponsor fruitful research programs which also feed into practice. This is very much the case with the program or programs that are under way at the George Mason University, especially in the school of economics and in affiliated research centres such as the Institute of Humane Studies, Mercatus and The Center for Study of Public Choice.
The programs range from a workshop on philosophy and politics through formal studies in economics to research on the rules of order among pirates, development in Africa, the history and sociology of popular culture and cuisine, recent hurricane-related problems and the export of democracy and peace to foreign lands. It would be tedious to list them all, they can be accessed from the George Mason site.
The people on the job include avowed Austrians, quasi Austrians and critics of Austrians. Not all will be equally excited by the notion of mixing Mises and Popper.
For counterparts to Alexander, check out Peter Boettke and Tyler Cowen, with apologies to everyone else who deserves a mention.
Further reading
For some developments on the idea of the George Mason program, see the revised version of the Austrian schol of thought that proceeded from the "More Austrian" School (adding Popper to the program, especially to provide a robust metaphysical framework) to the "Even More Austrian School" with the addition of another strand of Austrian thought from Brentano and Meinong.
