An offspinners improvement on 'reduction vs existence'.
The Even More Austrian Program
The purpose of  this effort is to explore the problem of explanation in the human and social sciences using the game of cricket as the model for the exercise. The idea was to improve on the most common approach to the explanation of human action by the two dominant psychological schools - behaviourism and psychoanalysis. Both of them seemed to me to represent “reduction versus existence”, which was the working title for the project at the time it started.


Problem:  How  do we account for the sequence of events in a game of cricket?

1. One answer is that it is all determined by the laws of physics.

This runs into the great debate between determinism and indeterminism, which is very technical and hard to call although the balance seems to have shifted to indeterminism in the last 100 years. I am inclined to reject determinism on the grounds that in psychology and society we have  emergent  entities that cannot be reduced  to physics and chemistry. A statement of this argument occurs in  Popper’s Objective Knowledge  (1973),  especially the essay “On Clouds and Clocks” which presents a theory of evolution and language to account for human freedom and creativity, within a kind of plastic control exerted by the laws of nature.

We can agree to disagree on the issue of determinism because the outcome of that debate does not resolve the problem of accounting for other influences in cricket like the rules of the game, customs and traditions about the way the game is played and the plans and stretegies of the players.

We  may accept that the laws of physics regulate some aspects of  the game such as the trajectory of the ball after it leaves  the bat. But this is no way to explain the course of the game.

2. What about the rules of the game?

They  obviously  have  some regulative effect, with two limitations.

a) The control exerted may be described as “plastic” rather  than “cast  iron” because the rules can be broken (or not fully  known or  understood) and umpires can make mistakes even when they are doing their best.

b) The rules account for certain features of the game but they do not  determine  the  course of events any more than the  laws of physics do.  To approach our objective we have to  consider  the really interesting features of the game, the strategy and tactics employed (at least by slow bowlers).

Two subsidiary sets of problems arise in connection  with  the rules:

a) Historical; where did they come from and how did they evolve?

b) Social/political; why are they obeyed (mostly), whose purposes do they serve, etc?

These will be left aside for the moment.  As for the history,  it is  not  clear  that much knowledge of  history  is  required  to understand  the current rules of the game.  As for observing  the rules,  the  need for special sanctions would only seem to  arise under very unusual conditions - one can envisage a police officer being  called to remove a stubborn batsman who defies the  umpire but I do not know of it happening.

On the topic of the purposes served - mostly they simply serve the purposes  of  people who  choose to  play cricket.  Under  some circumstances the rules may be changed for nationalistic  reasons to suit the interests of a country with a lot of fast bowlers or a  lot of slow bowlers or whatever (this would mean “getting  the numbers”  on  some  International Board of Control).  But this intrusion of politics or ideology does not upset the model that I am building, which will account for these intrusions.

Customs and traditions

Cricket is replete with customs and traditions in addition to the written rules of the game. These customs and traditions exert an influence on the way people play the game (consider the different approaches adopted by the English, the early West Indians and the Australians), they are plastic and they are highly variable between historical periods, places and even individual teams (even individual players). They have a different status from the written rules but no account of the game would be complete without paying attention to the role they play to influence the decisions and actions of players, crowds, umpires and other administrators.

3.  We  now  move  to another level of analysis to consider the strategy and tactics of the game.

These  things  cannot  be reduced to  psychology  (much  less  to physics)  and  they cannot be explained by the rules of the  game (though they do take the rules into account).

Reformulated problem: How to account for strategy and tactics?

These  things  relate to a situation  that can be  more  or  less objectively be  described  as the “state of the game”, which  may  be crudely  expressed  as the score (numbers can be  employed  here that ought to delight empiricists) though a better  description will include things like the state of the wicket, who is still to come in and whether medium/fast bowler Connell is having a good day.

But  strategy and tactics are not determined by the state of  the game, however fully this is specified because they are a response to the situation,  mediated by aims of a higher nature.  Here  we introduce aims and intentions at various levels. These aims and intentions will be restricted by the rules of the game and modified in various interesting ways by the customs and traditions in place at the time.

The  high level aim may be to win the series (or to avoid  losing the series, which is an important difference).

A  lower  level aim may be to win this game (or to  avoid  losing it).

A still lower level aim may be to bat first and score 400 runs.

…and  so  on,  down to the level of the bowler who as he runs in plans to bowl a slower ball, just outside off stump (an intention that of course may not be realised).

Our problem  has  now  shifted  to  accounting  for  aims  and intentions,  and,  more  important than accounting for  them,  to account for changing aims and intentions. Attempts to account for these things by tracing them to their source or basis notoriously lead  to  a  historical or psychological  regress  depending  on whether you opt for a social or individual explanation.  (This is where my analysis broke down at first).  Shifting to the  question of change may be more fruitful;  to paraphrase Marx, the point is to change aims and intentions, not to account for them.

Aims  and  intentions can be regarded as ideas; the kernel  of  the objective theory is that they can have a form of objective or real existence in addition to their existence in people’s minds.  This is  of  course a lunatic heresy by the standards  of  any  decent materialist  theory  of  mind  and  by  all  properly  scientific reductionist  theories of the universe.  Be that as it  may,  the theory  of  the  objective  mind and the  objective  contents  of thought has a lot going for it in solving problems including  the problem of strategy and tactics in cricket.

Reverting  to the concrete;  at any moment in the game the  rival captains  have  the option of playing for a win or a draw  (or, less  likely, a  loss  but  this could be  rational  under  some circumstances,  for example if one captain has been bribed or  if the  game is unimportant and a quick finish will allow more  time in the pub.) Depending on the choice of aim (which can be revised as the game proceeds) certain consequences will follow in the way of instructions to batsmen, field placings and the like.

According to the theory of the objective mind, a change in aim is not just a change of mind (though mental events are involved), it can  be  a  rational response to arguments and appraisal  or  re-appraisal  of the situation.  These arguments and  apraisals  use theories  to predict the likely outcomes of various options.  The use of arguments and theories to evaluate critically alternative plans  introduces  new dimensions to decision-making  and  social change  generally.  Considerations  of  logic  and  relevance  of arguments and truth and relevance of theories arise, and also the morality and consistency of aims.

To cut a long story short, human consciousness (a function of the brain) enables us to form intentions, to grasp abstract ideas and to  use  language to describe and argue the merits  of  competing ideas, whether aims, theories, or policies. These ideas, in their objective  form (spoken or written) have some kind  of  autonomy even  though they were produced by people in the first  instance. They can also have profound effects upon the world though to  do this they have to act through the agency of individual people who assimilate them (often in funny ways).

The autonomy,  or partial autonomy of these ideas in their spoken or  written  form eliminates the need for a full  historical  or psychological explanation of ideas. This enables us to get a grip on  some aspects of social change (and social order) that  create endless  problems  for social theorists who usually end up  in a historical or psychological regress through trying to account for ideas using subjective theories of knowledge.


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