Outline of The Poverty of Historicism
The Poverty of Historicism is a short book on the methods of the social sciences and the methods of social reform. It first appeared as a series of three journal articles in the 1940s and, with revisions, in book form in 1957.
Popper’s aim in this work was to transform the social sciences in the same way that he had transformed the philosophy of the natural sciences. This transformation had a moral and political purpose because he believed that defective views on the methods of the social sciences had contributed to the rise of fascism and communism. The book is dedicated to the victims of these movements.
He hoped that the social sciences could generate a social technology to underpin advances in social organisation in the same way that the natural sciences and technology have transformed the natural environment for human benefit.
The social science and the method of piecemeal social engineering that he envisaged would be value-free and hence would be subject to abuse (like science and technology) but not nearly to the same extent as political programs inspired by historicism (his label for a kind of historical determinism) and attempts to implement revolutionary utopian schemes.
Work on this book took a surprising turn when he reached section 10 on essentialism and nominalism. The notes that he took on the historical roots of essentialism and its linkage to historicism grew into the two volumes of The Open Society and its Enemies.
Popper later described The Poverty as his stodgiest piece of writing and his view on the descriptive and technological function of sociological laws did not stand up. Further confusion has been caused by his use of the term ‘historicism’. When he started in 1938 the term was not in general use so he felt free to define it to suit his his own purpose but by 1957 it was commonly used to translate ”historismus” from German which was similar but not the same as Popper’s usage.
Ian Jarvie wrote a paper to clarify some of the ideas in The Poverty and to suggest some of the reasons why it has been overlooked by many people at work in the social sciences. “It is my observation that these important cautions have gone almost unheeded, as witness the blithe radicalism in the academic atmosphere since the 1960s, with scarcely a passing thought for the actual aleviation of concrete suffering, still less for the danger of making things worse”.
Historicism
”I mean by historicism an approach to the social sciences which assumes that historical prediction is the principal aim, and which assumes that this aim is attainable by discovering the ‘rhythms’ or the ‘patterns’, the ‘laws’ or the ‘trends’ of history. Since I am convinced that such historicist doctrines of method are at bottom responsible for the unsatisfactory state of the theoretical social sciences (other than economic theory), my presentation is not unbiased. But I have tried hard to make out a case in favour of historicism in order to give point to my subsequent criticism…In other words, I have tried to perfect a theory which has often been put forward, but perhaps never in a fully developed form. This is why I have deliberately chosen the somewhat unfamiliar label ‘historicism’. By introducing it I hope I shall avoid merely verbal quibbles” (page 3).
The aim was to identifiy defective ideas about historical prediction and cognate misconceptions about the nature of the social sciences. The strategy was to identify a somewhat vague doctrine, which he called historicism, formulate it in the strongest form that he could manage and then demolish it.
The term pro-naturalistic applies to the view that the methods of physics can be used in history and the social sciences. The term anti-naturalistic applies to the opposite view, that the methods of physics do not work in the social sciences
The book has four parts
I. The anti-naturalistic doctrines of historicism
II The pro-naturalistic doctrines of historicism
III Criticism of the anti-naturalistic doctrines
IV Criticism of the pro-naturalistic doctrines
This appears to give the book a pleasing symmetry but the reality does not match the plan.
One of the complicating factors is the way that people who believed in historical determinism held a mix of anti-naturalistic and pro-naturalistic views. This would appear to be an incoherent position, but then historicism is an incoherent doctrine.
The belief in historical determinism (and hence prophecy of the future) was boosted by a particular (false) view of the nature of prediction in science, held at the same time as other beliefs about the futility of more modest kinds of scientific prediction that could be used for the improvement of social institutions and policy-making generally.
Question: How widespread is the idea of historical determinism is these days? It was highly prevalent when the book was first drafted, and maybe if the doctrine is defunct the book is a part of the reason.
First wave of criticism
Part I contains ten sections, each devoted to a particular reason why the methods of science (physics) cannot be used in the social sciences.
1. Generalisation.
2. Experiment.
3. Novelty.
4. Complexity.
5. Inexactitude of prediction.
6. Objectivity and valuation.
7. Holism.
8. Intuitive understanding.
9. Quantitative methods.
10. Essentialism versus nominalism.
For the most part these objections are misplaced, consisting of the elevation of difficulties to the level of impossibilities.
The sections in Part II are:
11. Comparison with astronomy, long-term forecasts and large-scale forecasts.
12. The observational basis.
13. Social dynamics.
14. Historical laws.
15. Historical prophecy vs social engineering.
16. The theory of historical development.
17. Interpreting vs planning social change.
18. Conclusion of the analysis.
The doctrines under attack in this part draw upon perceptions and misperceptions of the methods of physics to support the notion of historical determinism.
III Criticism of the anti-naturalistic doctrines
Moving away from the targets of criticism for the moment to pick up on Popper’s positive views.
Positive Views
These are largely spelled out in sections 19 to 21 and 28 to 32.
19. Practical aims of this criticism.
20. The technological approach to sociology.
21. Piecemeal versus utopian engineering.
28. The method of reduction. Causal explanation, prediction and prophecy.
29. The unity of method.
30. Theoretical and historical sciences.
31. Situational logic in history. Historical interpretation.
32. The institutional theory of progress.
19. Practical aims
Popper was not prepared to argue whether scientific research should be motivated by practical concerns or the search for truth because both objectives can be pursued at the same time by a good selection of problems and also by good communication between ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ researchers. As for debates on methods, he wrote “The more fruitful debates on method are always inspired by certain practical problems which face the research worker; and nearly all debates that are not so inspired are characterized by that atmosphere of futile subtlety which has brought methodology into disrepute with the practical research worker” (57).
He was prepared to take a stand with historicists on the common ground of concern for better methods to transform the social sciences to make them more helpful for public administrators, politicians, would-be social reformers and anyone else with an interest in the way social and economic systems work.
20. The technological approach
“The term ’social technology’ (and even more the term social engineering which will be introduced in the next section) is likely to arouse suspicion, and to repel those whom it reminds of the ’social blueprints’ of the collectivist planners, or perhaps even of the ‘technocrats’. I realise this danger, and so I have added the word ‘piecemeal’, both to offset undesirable associations and to express my conviction that ‘piecemeal tinkering’ (as it is sometimes called) combined with critical analysis, is the main way to practical results in the social as well as in the natural sciences” (58).
Hayek was not happy when he read Popper's thoughts on social engineering because he was concerned with the danger of "coercive utopians" who wanted to adopt an engineering attitude to social and political reform. Hayek's concern was misplaced because Popper explained that the enginering approach is neutral as to whether a social problem needs to be addressed by state intervention or refraining from intervention.
Popper's point was that practical people who work with machinery usually check very carefully to see if their tinkering (intervention) makes the thing work better or not. That is the mentality that he thought should be applied to social institutions.
Technological problems may be of a private or a public nature; examples of the former would be matters of business administration and productivity of the workforce, examples of the latter include controlling the trade cycle, the feasibility of centralized planning and “the question of how to export democracy to the Middle East”.
The focus on practical problems does not preclude an interest in theoretical problems but it does control the tendency for theory to degenerate into speculative metaphysics (a la Frankfurt School).
21. Piecemeal vs utopian engineering.
“Just as the main task of the physical engineer is to design machines and to remodel and service them, the task of the piecemeal social engineer is to design social institutions, and to reconstruct and run those already in existence” (64)
Popper articulates the familiar Scottish/Austrian refrain that only a minority of social institutions are consciously designed, and most have just grown as the unintended consequences of human actions. [Ian Jarvie has tenatively challenged this due to the very large amount of conscious tinkering that has been done over the last couple of centuries].
Piecemeal engineering (PE) may be private or public, the person opening a shop is an engineer in the sense of testing the market for his goods.
Furthermore, the PE will proceed in stages, alert to the results of his tinkering (so far as these can be assessed), like a mechanic building a machine or tuning an engine.
In contrast the utopian engineer is inclined to be in a hurry to realise grand schemes of a public nature. These may involve the remodelling of the ‘whole’ of society, more or less regardless of the results.
However it is worth noting that a common objection that radicals direct against PE is not valid, that is the small scope of the reforms. It is thought that engineering is inherently holistic, so that a piecemeal reform will be concerned with the whole of some small unit, like a village rather than the whole of the nation. However Popper pointed out that there is no inherent limit to the scope of PE, it just depends on the amount of knowledge and experience that can be brought to bear. In recent times he suggested grafting the French or German legal codes into Russion to make good the almost complete lack of a functioning legal system.
“It may be questioned, perhaps, whether the piecemeal and the holistic approaches here described are fundamentally different, considering that we have put no limits to the scope of a piecemeal approach…constitutional reform, for example, falls well within its scope [or tariff or taxation reforms which affect whole industries and all taxpayers]…Is there any difference, it may be asked, between the more ambitious kinds of piecemeal engineering and the holistic or Utopian approach? And this question maybecome even more pertinent if we consider that, when trying to assess the likely consequences of some proposed reform, the piecemeal tecnnologist must do his best to estimate the effects of any measure upon the ‘whole’ of society” (68)
“In answering this question, I shall not attempt to draw a precise line of demarcation between the twomethods, but I shall try to bring out the very different point of view from which the holist and the piecemeal technologist look upon the task of reforming society. The holist rejects the piecemeal approach as being too modest. Their rejection of it, however, does not quite square with their practice; for in practice they always fall back on a somewhat haphazard and clumsy although ambitious and ruthless application of what is essentially a piecemeal method without its cautious and self-critical character…Thus the difference turns out in practice to be a difference not so much in scale and scope as in caution and in preparedness for unavoidable surprises.(68-69)
“One of the differences between the Utopian or holistic approach and the piecemeal approach may therefore be stated in this way: while the piecemeal engineer can attack his problem with an open mind as to the scope of the reform, the holist cannot do this; for he has decided beforehand that a complete reconstruction is possible and necessary.” (69)
This anticipates the next section which is ‘The unholy alliance with holism’. As Popper explained elsewhere, especially in chapter 9 of OSE on Utopianism, the kind of leadership required to press ahead with grand schemes means that the leader will almost inevitably be told what he wants to hear, so it becomes wellnigh impossible to impose the rigors of criticism and testing to the Utopian experiment. The result of all this is now history.
Moving on to part IV.
Criticism of the doctrines of ”pro-naturalistic” hisoricists who attempt to recruit the methods of science for historical prediction.
27. Is there a law of evolution? Laws and trends.
28. The method of reduction. Causal explanation, prediction and prophecy.
29. The unity of method.
30. Theoretical and historical sciences.
31. Situational logic in history. Historical interpretation.
32. The institutional theory of progress.
33. Conclusion.
First Popper explained that the attempt to recruit the methods of science to predict the future course of history did not take account of the difference between laws and trends, and between prediction and prophecy.
Valid laws can be used, along with a statement of the initial conditions, to deduce a prediction. However this does not mean that scientific laws guarrantee that a trend will persist unless of course the conditions remain such as to produce outcomes which maintain the trend.
The success of long-term predictions in astronomy provided inspiration to Marx and Marxists when they spoke of discovering the laws of motion of the social system. However prediction in astronomy depends on the stability and relative isolation of the solar system and that kind of stability is precisely what is denied by people who are interested in major historical changes, revolutions and upheavals.
28. The method of reduction, etc.
This is methodological reduction, using laws and statements of conditions to deduce predictions.
“Thus we have two different constituents, two different kinds of statements which together yield a complete causal explanation: (1) Universal statements of the character of natural laws; and (2) specific statements pertaining to the special case in question, called the initial conditions…The initial conditions (or more precisely the situation described by them) are usually spoken of as the cause of the event in question.” (123)
On explanation, prediction and testing:
“The use of a theory for predicting is just another aspect of its use for explaining such an event. And since we test a theory by comparing the events predicted with those actually observed, our analysis also shows how theories can be tested. Whether we use a theory for the purpose of explanation, or prediction, or of testing, depends upon our interest; it depends upon the question which statements we consider as given or unproblematic, and which statements we consider to stand in need of further criticism, and of testing” (123).
[The hypothetico deductive or nomological deductive method of explanation using laws and initial conditions to deduce effects was described as the Popper-Hempel or covering law model of explanation. More recently Popper announced in note 178 of Unended Quest that his ‘covering law’ account of causation is superseded in physics by an approach based on propensities.]
29. In this section on the unity of method Popper argued that all generalizing sciences use the same deductive model of explanation.
30. Theoretical and historical sciences. The same model of explanation applies in each but in history the focus of interest is not the general theories but the particular events, that is, the situation and what happened. This distinction was made by Weber and was picked up by Talcott Parsons in The Structure of Social Action (1937).
In historical studies it is the point of view, or the narrative theme, that is the organizing principle, rather than the general laws that are the focus of attention in the generalizing sciences. This was the point made in chapter 25 of OSE in addressing the question of meaning in history. The meaning is imported and the particular interest of the historian dictates the events that are selected for analysis.
On the difference between the generalizing sciences and the historical sciences, Popper considered that the account which he expounded, following Max Weber, clarified the controversies between some schools of thought:
“One historicist group asserts that history, which does not merely enumerate facts but attempts to present them in some form of causal connection, must be interested in the formulation of historical laws, since causality means, fundamentally, determination by law. Another group, which also includes historicists, argues that even unique events, events which occur only once and have nothing general about them, may be the cause of other events, and that is the kind of causation that history is interested in. We can now see that both groups are partly right and partly wrong. Universal law and specific events are together necessary for any causal explanation, but outside the theoretical sciences, universal laws arouse little interest” (146).
Section 31. Situational logic in history. Historical interpretation
Alan Donagan, in the Shilpp volume on Popper, wrote that “the results of Popper’s examination of historicism were not all nevative. His exploration…led directly to two positive conclusions of great importance, the theory of situational logic in history, and the institutional theory of progress.”
This is a preliminary sketch of the situational logic or situational analysis which became one of Popper’signature ideas. The point is to get clear about the different organising principles for theoretical and historical studies. In theoretical studies (conducted by the generalizing sciences), work is organised around theories, their comparison and testing. The same logic applies when theories are used in for practical applications in technology, though this is not usually regarded as a part of the critical scientific enterprise. Of course theories are not usually applied until they have been tested well enough to be considered safe (with margins for error included in the designs).
The situation with historical studies is different and here the organising principle is the point of view, the story line for the narrative. There are any number of narratives and the test of truth can be applied but still one does not usually try to choose between different narratives in the way that one would try to choose between rival theories.
Popper noted that the historicists got into trouble here by elevating points of view to the status of universal explanatory theories. A classic case is the history of the class struggle. This can be illuminating but it is a point of view and it is an ”essentialist” error to parade that angle as a universal theory (history is essentially the history of the class struggle).
"Such selective approaches fulfil functions in the study of history which are in some ways analogous to those of theories in science. It is therefore understandable that they have often been taken for theories. And indeed, those rare ideas inherent in these approaches which can be formulated in the form of testable hypotheses, whether singular or universal, may well be treated as scientific hypotheses. But as a rule, these historical ‘approaches’ or ‘points of view’ cannot be tested. They cannot be refuted, and apparent confirmations are therefore of no value, even if they are as numerous as the stars in the sky. We shall call such a selective point of view or focus of historical interest, if it cannot be formulated as a testable hypothesis, a historical interpretation."
"Historicism mistakes these interpretations for theories. This is one of its cardinal errors. It is possible, for example, to interpret ‘history’ as the history of class struggle, or of the struggle of races for supremacy, or as the history of religious ideas, or as the history of the struggle between the ‘open’ and the ‘closed’ society, or as the history of scientific and industrial progress. All these are more or less interesting points of view, and as such perfectly unobjectionable. But historicists do not present them as such; they do not see that there is necessarily a plurality of interpretations which are fundamentally on the same level of both, suggestiveness and arbitrariness (even though some of them may be distinguished by their fertiliy–a point of some importance). Instead, they present them as doctrines or theories, asserting that ‘all history is the history of class struggle’, etc. And if they actually find that their point of view is fertile, and that many facts can be ordered and interpreted in its light, then they mistake this for a confirmation, or even for a proof, of their doctrine."
"On the other hand, the classical historians who rightly oppose this procedure are liable to fall into a different error. Aiming at objectivity, they feel bound to avoid any selective point of view; but since this is impossible, they usually adopt points of view without being aware of them. This must defeat their efforts to be objective, for one cannot possibly be critical of one’s own approach, and conscious of its limitations, without being aware of it."
"The way out of this dilemma, of course, is to be clear about the necessity of adopting a point of view; to state this point of view plainly, and always to remain conscious that it is one among many, and that even if it should amount to a theory, it may not be testable."
In this section there is an extremely compacted statement about the need for instutional studies.
"Beyond this logic of situations, or perhaps as a part of it, we need something like an analysis of social movements. We need studies, based on methodological individualism, of the social institutions through which ideas may spread and captivate individuals, of the way in which new traditions may be created, and of the way in which traditions work and break down. In other words, our individualistic and institutionalist models of such collective entities as nations, or governments, or markets, will have to be supplemented by models of political situations as well as of social movements such as scientific and industrial progress. (A sketch of such an analysis of progress will be found in the next section.)"
This can be seen as a call for the kind of work where Douglas North won a Nobel Prize. In his acceptance speech he stated “Institutions form the incentive structure of a society and the political and economic institutions, in consequence, are the underlying determinant of economic performance.”
Section 32 The Institutional Theory
S 32 provides an example of the institutional approach as an alternatile to the psychlogicsm of Comte and Mill. They believed that progress in science and industry is an absolute trend, based on the progressive tendency of the human mind. Popper noted that ther are other tendencies of the huma mind like forgetfullness, indolence and dogmatism.
"If we wish to replace this surprisingly naïve theory by a more tenable one, we have to make two main alterations. First, we have to attempt to find conditions of progress, and to this end we must try to imagine, for example, conditions under which progress would be arrested. This immediately leads to the realization that a psychological propensity alone cannot be sufficient to explain progress, since conditions may be found on which it may depend. Thus we must, next, replace the theory of psychological propensities by something better; I suggest, by an institutional (and technological) analysis of the conditions of progress."
He speculated about ways to arrest scientific and industrial progress, for example by closing down (or subjecting to political control) laboratories for research, scientific periodicals, congresses and conferences, universities and printing presses. This is a part of his take on the social nature of science, spelled out in Chapter 23 of The Open Society (an early sign of the “social turn” described by Ian Jarvie).
"Science, and more especially scientific progress, are the results not of isolated efforts but of the free competition of thought. For science needs ever more competition between hypotheses and ever more rigorous tests. And the competing hypotheses need personal representation, as it were: they need advocates, they need a jury, and even a public. This personal representation must be institutionally organized if we wish to ensure that it works. And these institutions have to be paid for, and protected by law. Ultimately, progress depends very largely on political factors; on political institutions that safeguard the freedom of thought: on democracy."
