This book addresses issues ranging from the philosophy of science to literary criticism and it aims to make them accessible to anyone who is interested, regardless of academic training or qualifications. Philosophy should have something to offer everyone and it should not become the exclusive preserve of specialists. As Karl Popper said, we are all philosophers some of the time and if we find that the professionals do not speak to our condition the problem may lie with them, not with us.
The articles collected here were written over a long time for many different purposes and publications. They are unified by the thrust to explain how Popper's ideas correct various debilitating errors in thinking that are widespread and are actively promulgated by philosophers. He has broken with three major philosophical preoccupations:
1. The justification of knowledge by authority.
2. The theory that knowledge is a form of belief.
3. The analysis of concepts and the meaning of words.
1 and 2 may be summarised as the quest for justified beliefs. This quest, as worthy as it appears, has been frustrated by the simple fact that such beliefs cannot be found. The reason for this is desperately simple: anyone can persist in demanding further statements to justify the previous statement that was made to justify the previous statement to infinity, or to an infinite regress as they say in the trade. There is no logical end point to the process where a persistent critic, like a nagging child, just keeps on asking "Why?" The answer is equally simple, that is, to settle for a critical preference for a position or a theory that has proved its worth by solving problems (as well or better than the alternatives) and standing up to criticism (as well or better than the alternatives).
A critical preference can change when new evidence or new arguments come to light. It may be possible to specify what sort of evidence or arguments would be required for such a shift to occur and it will usually be possible to specify what would count as a better position or theory.
The futility of the quest for justified beliefs has been demonstrated with particular clarity by William W Bartley, a student of Popper, as explained in chapter 8. Bartley's work reveals a particularly sinister consequence of the demand for rationally justified beliefs; it tends to perpetuate its opposite, namely the rejection of rationality, when it turns out that beliefs cannot be justified due to the problem of the infinite regress. In advertising language, the rationalists who pin their hopes on justified beliefs are helping to "sell the other guy's product" (irrationalism).
Cultural Implications
Popper's theory of learning by a process of trial and error has some striking similarities with the Darwinian theory of biological evolution, and he has been an important figure in the revival of evolutionary epistemology (see chapter 12). His ideas have major cultural, psychological and even spiritual implications. The title Reason and Imagination signals that this theory brings reason and imagination into harmony, to correct the unbalanced, even schizophrenic situation since the triumph of Newton's theory. This was widely perceived as the full flowering of the so-called inductive method to find the truth by accumulating observations. But this achievement provoked a revolt by romantics and poets who could not stomach a view of human activity that had no place for the imagination. Nor could they accept the mechanical universe. The result of this collision has been a kind of cultural schizophrenia, with imagination set against reason, the organic set against the mechanical, the inspiration of the poet set against the empiricism of the scientist.
Popper's theory cures this cultural schizophrenia. It harmonises the complementary roles and relationships of reason, imagination, logic, evidence, tradition, inspiration, mathematics and metaphysics. Consequently there is no need for the tensions and antagonisms that flow from partial and narrow views of problem-solving and creativity, whether in science, art, technology or daily life.
Political Considerations
There are political benefits in replacing theological or "true belief" theories of knowledge with the "critical preference" approach. True believers who think that they have hold of the truth (by reference to the proper authority) are apt to be intolerant of differences of opinion, whether on matters of religion, morals or politics. A difference of opinion is likely to be attributed to moral deficiencies on the part of the unbeliever, or to a conspiracy on the part of some malevolent power that seeks to keep people from knowing the truth. The results in practice include political totalitarianism, intolerance, fanaticism, and institutions such as the Inquisition that attempt to save people from their own error and sin.
Given the historical preponderance of authoritarian theories of knowledge the traditions of democracy and tolerance wherever they exist at present must be seen as truly remarkable developments. They are also highly fragile which accounts for their tendency to break down during times of emergency such as war. Similarly, under stress, reasonable and tolerant people can break down and lapse into dogmatic and uncritical thinking. This observation is not a concession to pessimists who believe in the unregenerate irrationality of people. Quite the reverse; in view of the almost universal acceptance of authoritarian theories of knowledge it is difficult to see why people are ever tolerant and how a tradition of tolerance ever took root. This situation can be expected to improve with wider understanding of Popper's non-authoritarian theory of knowledge and Bartley's contribution to the ancient problem of rationality and the limits of criticism.
Objective Knowledge
Popper's second major break with tradition is his challenge to "subjective belief" theories of knowledge which depict genuine knowledge is a particularly sound and well justified form of belief, to be contrasted with mere opinion (belief not properly based). In opposition Popper has advanced a theory of knowledge as an objective, evolutionary social construct . This form of knowledge is not reducible to people's individual or collective beliefs; it is not supernatural and it is not a form of mystical group mind. A homely and conceptually unexciting example is the information in the telephone directory (which indicates that objective knowledge can be wrong).
As was the case with the recourse to an authority to provide a foundation for knowledge, the theory of subjective knowledge has some unfortunate social and political consequences. It affects the attitudes that people adopt towards critical discussion and towards the social and political institutions that are required to maintain standards of tolerance and reason. According to the theory of subjective knowledge, our knowledge is a part of us. Any suggestion that our knowledge is wrong, that we are in error, can be interpreted as an attack on us personally and indeed is often enough intended as such. In extreme forms the attack on error becomes an attack on the morality and human worth of the person. Under these conditions people are unwilling to admit that they are wrong and may cling dogmatically to a belief long past the point where it has any credibility. This of course prevents them from learning and growing because admission of error is likely to be regarded as a personal triumph for opponents, rather than an honest attempt to learn and grow.
Driven Mad by Words
Popper's third decisive break from the mainstream of philosophy is his rejection of conceptual analysis. This error in method is widespread in the mind industry. "First define your terms" is one of its slogans, also the belief that it is important to find an answer to "What is..." questions; what is the state, democracy, justice, freedom? Karl Popper labeled this error "essentialism". It consists of a cluster of theories and practices which deflect discourse from matters of truth and falsity, or whether to pursue this policy or that, into arguments about the meaning of terms. This converts substantial problems into merely verbal ones, and far from being recognised as error, the shift from the concrete to the conceptual is often regarded as the distinguishing characteristic of genuinely rigorous theoretical work. This chain of argument turns up an important result, similar to the discovery that the element of dogmatism in traditional theories of rationality has sustained an environment that promotes irrationalism. The shocking conclusion is that essentialist methodologies destroy the critical faculties of people who are inducted into them and generate anti-intellectualism among people who refuse to play the game. The "house of intellect" loses both ways, by the corruption of its inhabitants and the distrust aroused among outsiders
As a result of Popper's break from conceptual analysis and the quest for justified belief there is limited interaction between Popper's followers and the mainstream of academic philosophy. Bartley wrote that if Popper is on the right track then many academic philosophers are wasting a lot of their time, and the time of their students. This is a big call, and time will tell whether Bartley was correct. In the meantime there is plenty of work to be done to unpack the implications of Popper's ideas.
Rafe Champion
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