Nicola Chiaramonte suggested in Encounter May 1972 that the European crisis of conscience has grown deeper and more widespread. This crisis concerns the nature of truth, the meaning and purpose of life, the reality or otherwise of progress and the role, if any, of the intellectual in the affairs of the world. Kierkegaard, Kafka, Neitzsche, Rimbaud and many others have given us various perspectives upon this crisis but they have not formulated the problems in such a way that rational solutions could be proposed. Indeed the thrust of their arguments seems to be that there cannot be any rational solutions.
But solutions are at hand if we are prepared to take arguments seriously. We must not be overawed by those who argue against the rational basis of argument by claiming that our theories are determined by our class, our culture, our interest or our framework of ideas. This line of thought (relativism or perhaps determinism) can be used to imply that it is a waste of time to try to come to any understanding with the members of different groups an ultimately it implies that we cannot communicate meaningfully with any other person. People who preach the impotence of arguments are in a paradoxical position, analogous the paradox of the liar.
There remain the problems of people who want to take arguments seriously but are frustrated and driven to skepticism when they find that their theory of rationality is inconsistent or inadequate. William W Bartley has formulated a general solution to the problem. (Actually, writing three decades later, it seems that the underlying problem is better described as the problem of the limits of criticism or the problem of the infinite regress versus dogmatism. See Agreeing to Disagree: Bartley's Critique of Reason. He achieved this by developing Popper's 'critical rationalism', following Popper's identification of the authoritarian structure of Western thought, into a theory which he called 'comprehensively critical rationalism'. He argued that the only premise required for a sound and consistent rationalism is the principle of criticism; the premises of an argument must always be open to further discussion and criticism. This theory implies that we should not try to provide ultimate justification for a theory, instead we should be content to justify a critical preference for one theory rather than another, at that particular stage of the discussion.
I will proceed within this general theory of rationality to argue against two particular types of skepticism. (A third strand of skepticism or irrationalism will not be considered in depth here. This is the cultural backlash against science and reason which are supposed to be united in opposition to imagination and the creative life of the mind. This line of thought comes to us through William Blake, who was consciously revolting against Bacon and Locke, and the Romantics. It is a revival of the ancient doctrine of the divine madness of poetic inspiration and outriders to this counter-cultural bandwagon include the importers of Indian mysticism and the people who keep live the tradition of genius and insanity which is sometimes used a rationale for drug use. In so far as this movement is a reaction to the inductive method of science it should lose momentum when the principles of the hypothetico-deductive scheme are more widely understood).
The first form of skepticism questions the rationality of the empirical base of science; the second questions the possibility of conducting rational arguments in the domain of values. Both these strands of skepticism may be traced back to Hume who pointed out both the problem of induction in the philosophy of science and also the impossibility of deriving 'ought' statements from 'is' statements. The two problems are similar in form - there is no logical method to produce general laws from the observation of individual events and there is no logical way to derive ethical proposals or principles from matters of fact.
The Problem of Induction
Since Hume the problem of induction has been the main concern on the philosophy of science. It can be formulated in a number of ways but it usually involves the justification of beliefs, based on observation. Repeated attempts have been made to provide science with a genuine empirical base by the means of a principle or a formula to justify the derivation of general principles from individual facts. Scientists, in the main, have taken little notice of this problem and philosophers have generally not accepted Popper's response to it.
Popper shifted the focus from the justification of belief to the problem of forming a critical preference for one theory rather than another on the basis of content, verisimilitude and testability. This shift took place within the wider framework of the hypothetico-deductive scheme, foreshadowed by Whewell, Jevons and Pierce, aptly described by Medawar as the most important methodological discovery of modern thought. Other components of Popper's theory are Tarski's correspondence theory of truth, the falsifiability criterion for demarcation of science from non-science, the non-authoritarian theory of knowledge and the distinction between subjective and objective knowledge.
A theory of objective knowledge is required to prevent epistemology from collapsing into solipsism or subjectivism which tends to happen with both classical rationalism (where the Truth comes from the clear and distinct intuition of ideas) and classical empiricism (where the Truth is based upon the clear, unbiased perception of sense data), Both these theories ultimately beg the question 'Do I exist?' although empiricists usually stop short of this question and concentrate their attention on theories of perception and the existence of other minds.
Insofar as the rationality and the credibility of science were supposed to be based on the method of induction, the failure to solve the problems connected with induction threatens the reputation of science. However Popper has shown that the growth of scientific knowledge does not depend on induction, and in doing so he has shifted the problem of objectivity. It ceases to be a problem for individual scientists, requiring that they be unbiased, rational and free from preconceptions. It becomes a situational or institutional problem, (as Popper described in his critique of the sociology of knowledge) requiring such things as theoretical pluralism, clear formulation of the problems that the theories are supposed to solve, the design of critical experiments, the existence of journals, seminars and conferences to facilitate critical discussion. Some of these requirements need to be provided by individual scientists, especially new ideas and imaginative criticism; others call for institutions, including political institutions, to protect the autonomy of the journals and the research institutes. See also Ian Jarvie on Popper's "social turn".
Is and Ought
The second strand of skepticism concerns the justification of values since Hume showed that moral (ought) proposals cannot be logically derived from factual (is) propositions. Moral philosophers have tried to close the gap in various ways in the hope of finding a rational base for ethics rather than being forced to make a choice between some arbitrary external authority or an existential leap of faith (or lonely despair). Popper addressed some aspects of this situation in Chapter 5 of The Open Society, under the heading of Nature and Convention to signal the fundamental difference between facts and values (or propositions and proposals).
Conventional authorities were challenged from all sides but none of the contenders fared any better (in terms of philosophical justification) than the rivals which they unceremoniously elbowed aside.
This theoretical dilemma had an objective correlate in the disastrous events of the Great War and its aftermath. An objective correlate of a different kind was the neurasthenia of the romantics, dreamers and aesthetes who had no idea what to do. Throughout the nineteenth century the problem of values was predominantly a concern of literary figures because scientists were busy on the job without taking much notice of the problem of induction and ordinary folk were just trying to get on as best they could. Then the Great War revealed that the apparently solid and progressive edifice of Western Civilisation was more akin to a cardhouse; then the concerns of Neitzsche and Kafka became pressing for all thinking people. In a more immediate and brutal way they also became a matter of life and death to those living under communism and fascism.
The moral dilemma of the intellectuals intensified with the crisis in science precipitated by Einstein's challenge to Newton, and to popular interpretations of Freud's theories. Both Freud and Einstein, very much against their own wishes, were pressed into service for relativism in truth and values.
Forming critical preferences
Can moral problems be formulated in such a way that critical arguments can be brought against them, thus placing them in the realm of rational discussion? I will argue that they can, if we stop looking for some Source to provide ultimate justification for a set of moral principles. Instead we should attempt to tentatively establish a critical preference for one (or more principles rather than another (or others), in a particular situation.
There are still, or course, many difficulties to overcome:
1.
If values cannot be derived from facts, then what is the relationship, if any, between them? What role do facts have to play in arguments about values?
If values cannot be derived from facts, then what is the relationship, if any, between them? What role do facts have to play in arguments about values?2.How can we avoid subjectivism, for instance Ayer's view that ethical proposals are expressions of emotion?
How can we avoid subjectivism, for instance Ayer's view that ethical proposals are expressions of emotion?3.If we are concerned with situations, how do we meet the criticism that "situational ethics" are a form of relativism, lacking general principles of value that transcend particular situations?
If we are concerned with situations, how do we meet the criticism that "situational ethics" are a form of relativism, lacking general principles of value that transcend particular situations?4.How do we avoid sterile verbal debates about the definition of terms such as The Nature of the Good?
How do we avoid sterile verbal debates about the definition of terms such as The Nature of the Good?5.Just what will be involved in a critical discussion of ethical proposals?
Just what will be involved in a critical discussion of ethical proposals?Taking these points in order.
1'. Factual considerations will bear upon moral preferences without determining them. There is an "is/ought dualism". See 5' below.
2'. On the objectivity of moral proposals, Popper's 'world 3' of objective contents of thought saves epistemology from subjectivism and it can do the same thing for moral philosophy.
3'. Critics of situational ethics usually argue that if we do not accept their particular set of absolutes we will be plunged into relativism because without their unquestioned standards our behaviour becomes a matter of whim and fancy, or narrow self-interest. But there is at least one more alternative; given objective [though tentative] standards we can for a critical preference for a certain set without putting them beyond criticism and without committing ourselves to whim and fancy.
4'. Relevance and urgency. Our attention to concrete situations does not mean that we have to do without general principles but it may save us from irrelevant world games if our paramount concern is with people and their welfare. Thus moral problems which concern people are more urgent than problems in aesthetics which concern the evaluation of works of art (important as this may be in some situations). This point does not need to be pursued further unless someone produces arguments to support the theory that the most pressing problems of value do not concern the welfare of people.
Criticism in Ethics
Our proposals will exist in a hierarchy. At a rather high level will be proposals like the aims of minimising suffering, avoiding tyranny and promoting tolerance. At the bottom will be specific proposals for reform of this or that institution. One might be tempted to place at the apex of the hierarchy something like 'the greatest good of mankind as a whole' but fascists, socialists and democrats might agree with this, which suggests that it is rather empty.
Criticism will consist of pointing out contradictory principles, or consequences of principles which are contradictory with each other or with other principles. Another form of criticism would be to show that various concrete proposals do not in fact produce the desired consequences. I will show how this criticism might operate by means of an example, designed to promote tolerance: for instance one might propose that newspapers and journals would be censored or subjected to some penalty if they do not make provision for a certain amount of criticism of editorial policy, perhaps in the letters section. Some publications have been notorious for providing their readership with the 'party line', uncomplicated by alternative points of view. Critics of this proposal might appeal to a higher principle, claiming that this provision restricts the freedom of the editors. Reply: it does not restrict their freedom to ventilate their own ideas, merely their freedom to limit the exposure of their readers to opposing views, a freedom which is inconsistent with the principle of promoting tolerance. Further, it poses a threat to the survival of the open society which requires that the citizens should have some knowledge of the competing arguments in any situation.
One would hope that the debate with critics of the proposal would allow various interpretations of freedom and tolerance to be considered, which would be valuable even if the proposed regulation did not proceed. In this situation, other critics might argue that the proposal would not have the desired effect in practice, despite being consistent with the highest principles. The editors might comply by printing innocuous criticisms, or incoherent criticisms, or the readers might not read them. Some of these considerations might be overcome by judicious drafting of the regulations, others would be open questions for research.
It is hard to specify how far moral philosophers should be expected to become involved in empirical sociology, psychology, economics, etc but it is fairly clear that a great deal of debate occurs on moral proposals where the consequences of different procedures are extremely uncertain due to lack of knowledge. So if moral philosophers take more interest in concrete situation, and if they try harder to envisage the likely outcomes of different decisions, they might locate important problems worthy of the attention of the sociologists and other scientists.
Conclusions
The rationality of science and values may be saved if we reject the tradition of seeking some ultimate justification of belief and try instead to establish critical preferences for various propositions or proposals rather than others. If we do this, then the problems of rationality and objectivity shift from the domain of individual psychology and become problems of critical argument and institutional reform.
In science, our arguments will be mostly concerned with error elimination and in ethics we will usually have to try to choose the lesser of evils. This is barely tolerable for absolutists and utopians which is why they are prone to lapse into relativism. However the critical rationalist can accept this provided that he is prepared to learn from his mistakes. If this suggests that we are satisfied with less rigorous arguments then it is up to our critics to keep us honest by locating the weak spots of our case. For instance we are deeply in debt to Edmund Burke who located many defects in the early rationalist philosophy.
Our continued efforts do not depend upon any laws of progress, they depend on our resolution to work for changes consistent with our principles, provided that our principles stand the test of criticism. We seem to be making progress in some respects - in the west we no longer burn witches or put heretics on the rack - and there is a growing realisation that the behaviour of consenting adults in private is not the concern of the state. Areas of confusion remain, for instance in euthanasia and the social responsibilities of scientists (and public servants) but we should welcome difficult test cases because they force us to sharpen our principles by bringing them to bear on new problems.
Rafe Champion 1972
