The error of essentialism is widespread in the mind industry. 'First define your terms' is one of its slogans, and especially the belief that it is important to find an answer to 'What is...?' questions; what is the state, democracy, justice, freedom? The more advanced form of the error is entrenched in the mainstream of philosophy and the social sciences, propped up by the belief that progress consists of refining concepts.
Karl Popper labeled this error 'essentialism'. It consists of a cluster of theories and practices which deflect discourse from matters of truth and falsity, or whether to pursue this policy or that, into arguments about the meaning of terms. This converts substantial problems into merely verbal ones, and far from being recognised as error, the shift from the concrete to the conceptual is often regarded as the distinguishing characteristic of genuinely rigorous theoretical work. This chain of argument turns up an important result, similar to the discovery that the element of 'true belief' dogmatism in traditional theories of rationality has sustained an environment that promotes irrationalism. The shocking conclusion is that essentialist methodologies destroy the critical faculties of people who are inducted into them and generate anti-intellectualism among people who refuse to play the game. The 'house of intellect' loses both ways, by the corruption of its inhabitants and the distrust aroused among outsiders.
Popper's response is summarised in his anti-essentialist exhortation and the claim that new ideas, not refined concepts, are needed to solve problems.
Never let yourself be goaded into taking seriously, problems about words and their meanings. What must be taken seriously are questions of fact, and assertions about facts: theories and hypotheses; the problems they solve and the problems they raise... The ad hoc method of dealing with problems of clarity or precision as the need arises might be called dialysis, in order to distinguish it from analysis: from the idea that language analysis as such may solve problems, or create an armory for future use. Dialysis cannot solve problems. It cannot do so any more than definitions or explication or language analysis can: problems can only be solved with the help of new ideas. Unended Quest, section 7.
Further criticism of essentialism can be found in Chapter 3 and Chapter 11 of The Open Society and its Enemies.
Bhiku Parekh struck back on behalf of the essentialists in a chapter on Popper in Contemporary Political Philosophers (Martin Robertson, 1982). This chapter runs to 30 pages and the first 25 contain perhaps the best short summary of Popper's philosophy that is available. After a fair and generous appreciation of the main lines of Popper's thought Parekh then devotes five pages to a scathing critique of Popper's political philosophy. The initial effect of this is likely to be devastating for people not acquainted with Popper's own writing, and especially for those who have not grasped his criticism of essentialism.
Parekh claims that Popper's political theory is 'fundamentally inadequate' because 'his view of society is false, as is his view of the nature of government'. In his eyes it is a major defect that Popper does not explore:
...the nature of the state, the nature and limits of law...Thanks to his non-authoritarian perspective, questions relating to the nature of authority, law, obligation, duty and right simply do not engage his attention. As a result, Popper's political theory contains large gaps. He examines the nature of public discussion and criticism but not the structure and basis of authority; he discusses what objectives government or law should aim at but not what government or law are. Since questions relating to the nature of authority are crucial, Popper cannot avoid answering them.
It must be asked what is to be gained by discourse on the nature of authority because Popper's major concern in his political commentary is to point out some defects in the theories of liberalism, democracy, justice and social reform which have confused and divided the friends of freedom. Some views on the nature of authority can be drawn from Popperian theory, especially from his 'three world' ontology (bodies, minds and ideas), described in the chapters on objective knowledge and literary criticism. One type of power is based on physical force; this may be described as 'world 1' power (to do with material things). This is the power of brute strength, the pistol, the gun-butt and the whip. Power in 'World 2' derives from authority over the mind by intimidation either by threat of physical force or by the weight of traditional authorities. 'World 3' or rational authority derives from the cogency of arguments and evidence, independent of physical force and subjective intimidation. Of the three forms of power the third is non-authoritarian and non-coercive.
Parekh's main attack is directed at Popper's failure to provide an adequate account of the essential nature of things such as political authority and the state. A second and relatively minor thrust consists of attributing to Popper various ideas that he does not hold. He writes that for Popper 'Political institutions are 'always...designed with certain aims in mind' but this unsourced extract is quite the reverse of Popper's often-stated view that 'only a minority of social institutions are consciously designed, while the vast majority have just "grown" as the undesigned results of human actions' (The Open Society vol 1, page 23).
Parekh claims that Popper, as a rationalist, naively overlooks the multitude of factors which undermine the rational and open-minded discussion of political issues '...the background conditions for a rational and critical debate are generally conspicuous by their absence from political life'. In fact Popper does not argue that society or politics are essentially or basically rational; it seems that Parekh's essentialism has forced him into a misinterpretation of Popper again at this point. Popper suggests, as a proposal for humanitarian policy, that we should do our best to be more rational, and to find better ways to solve our social problems. People may choose to reject these proposals and if so they had better look out for the consequences. For Popper, the presence of factors which undermine the rational and open-minded discussion of political issues represent an agenda for action to improve the situation, especially when this can be done by cleaning up the act of those who are in favour of reason but undermine their own position by errors such as essentialism and justificationism.
The Language of Proposals or Political Demands
It seems that Parekh cannot see how Popper can avoid the task of providing definitions of the nature of things and so he misreads Popper's proposals as simplistic attempts to provide definitions. He made no attempt to reply to Popper's critique of essentialism, or to Popper's alternative approach which makes use of what he described as the 'language of political proposals or demands'.
Popper's critique of essentialism takes several lines, one of which is to question the existence of essences or natures of complex things, which can be usefully described in a definition. This argument does not deny the need to use terms as a shorthand label for longer descriptions but these are merely a matter of convention and convenience (Open Society, chapter 11. The notes to this chapter, especially this one dating from the 1940s, contain detailed critiques of Wittgenstein's ideas that have attracted little notice from philosophers. It should also be noted that most words can have more than one meaning (definition) and so the meaning has to be read in the context of the problem or argument where the word is deployed. More weighty is the argument that when we formulate a description or agree to use a particular definition, nothing of real importance has been decided, neither the truth of a theory nor a desired course of action. In the design and reform of political and social institutions we need policy proposals and aims, not definitions.
JUSTICE AND THE ORGANIC STATE
At this point the critique in this paper shifts to the doctrine of the organic state, 'positive' freedom and totalitarian justice to show how these have been accepted by many humanitarians under the influence of Plato's arguments based on the essentialist methodology. On the topic of justice, the key chapter in The Open Society is Chapter 6 where Popper offers a brief statement of a democratic and equalitarian theory of justice. This is not supposed to be a definition of Justice; it is cast in the language of political proposals, not the language of the definition of essences. It runs as follows:
(a) An equal distribution of the burdens of citizenship; (b) equal treatment of the citizens before the law, provided, of course, that (c) the laws show neither favour nor disfavour towards individual citizens or groups or classes; (d) impartiality of the courts of justice.
That chapter in Popper's book contains a criticism of Plato's theory of justice, also an exposition of the liberal or protective state, and an introduction to the language of political proposals. Popper sheds some light on Plato's rhetorical method and illustrates some of the lasting confusions that Plato created, for example in linking individualism with selfishness and altruism with the collectivism of the organic state. The lasting impact of these ideas is shown by the fact that Hegel's theory of the state, far from being an innovation, was in fact reformulation of Plato's theory of the organic community where the individual finds his deepest fulfillment by identity with the whole. Hegel is a pivotal figure in the Platonic revival and apparently Parekh has a larger target than Popper, namely the liberal theory of the state. He writes '..the categories in terms of which most political philosophers conceptualise the state are rooted in nineteenth century liberalism and are almost wholly inadequate. Hegel's Philosophy of right has more to say about the nature of the modern state than does the work of many of our contemporaries'.
The continuity in totalitarian thought is readily apparent in moving from Plato's Republic to Parekh and other commentators on Hegel's theory of freedom and justice. Plato's ideal state is a rigidly stratified hierarchy where people are born into their proper niche and remain there, undisturbed by selfish and greedy desires for individualism and equality. There is no trade with other states because this might enable disruptive ideas into the country along with the goods. Everyone should look to a leader at all times and education is limited to the upper class of guardians, under strict supervision. Heavy censorship prevails and poets are likely to be banished or suppressed. The ultimate criterion of justice is the smooth and stable functioning of the whole society rather than the interests of the individual and for Plato the greatest evils are individualism and social chaos which are linked in that the latter is caused by the former.
Apologists claim that it is unfair to brand Plato as a totalitarian because the Greeks did not have our modern concepts of democracy. After all, Athens still depended on slaves. But there was a viable democratic movement whose sentiments were articulated by Pericles in his great funeral oration and there was even a hint of a move against slavery. There is substantial evidence both internal to the dialogues and external, to show that Plato, far from being ignorant of modern notions of justice and freedom, actively attacked the theory of equalitarian democracy that survives today as a part of the classical liberal tradition. The subsequent popularity of Plato's ideas, even among democrats and humanitarians, is a tribute to his rhetorical skills and his eye for weaknesses in the case for democracy and the protective state.
One such weakness is the 'natural rights' theory of equalitarian justice, which is enshrined in the slogan that 'we are all born equal'. In most visible characteristics human beings are manifestly unequal, or at least dissimilar and for this reason the 'natural rights' basis of equality before the law is easily undermined. The theory of equality before the law and other aspects of democratic justice need to be defended in the language of political proposals or demands, not in the essentialist language of natural rights. A democrat who claims that people are naturally or essentially equal is likely to encounter the argument that people are naturally or essentially unequal. The ensuing debate may provide entertainment for students in undergraduate tutorials but it has little to offer people actively engaged in tending or mending the traditions and institutions of an imperfectly democratic state.
Another polemic device which Plato exploited is the alleged tension between individualism and altruism. He managed to associate individualism with selfishness and greed, and linked altruism with the collectivism of his organic state. In the dialogues the case for individualism came from a political desperado of the worst kind while the case for altruism fell to 'Socrates' who emphasised the harmony and well being of citizens in the ideal state. This view on individualism and altruism informs modern psychology, especially psychoanalytical theory that has impacted heavily on the popular mind. Consequently a debate about human nature and the prospects for rational social reform often takes the form of an argument between those who claim that human nature is essentially individualistic or selfish and those who retort that human nature is basically social or altruistic. This argument extends to ethology and sociobiology where some geneticists speak of 'selfish genes' and the instinctual basis of violence and aggression while on the other side sociologists and Marxists insist that pathological behaviour spring from social and environmental influences. These largely futile arguments distract attention from the critical appraisal of traditions and institutions which cause suffering and violence. Work along these lines can proceed quite independently of the interminable debates between rival essentialists.
Plato created a major problem for modern democrats by undermining the protective theory of the state, which requires demands or proposes that the state should protect the rights and freedoms of minority groups and individuals from unreasonable interference by majorities and other groups. What counts as 'unreasonable interference' and what 'positive' benefits may be provided in addition to the minimal degree of protection has to be decided by each generation in the light of its resources and wants. The case for the protective state is too often presented in the form of an argument about the 'essential nature' of the state (to be protective) or in the form of an argument about the historical origin of the state by a Social Contract for protection. Social contract theory is probably the most common line of march adopted by liberals to get out from under the totalitarian theory of the organic state. Contract theory runs from Locke to Nozick and it postulates that people once lived in a primitive state of nature, with lives 'nasty, brutish and short' until they banded together under a social contract for mutual support and protection, perhaps under the tutelage of a 'Leviathan' state. Like the idea that we are all born equal, this theory can be subjected to devastating criticism because there is no evidence of anything remotely resembling a social contact and everything indicates that people were social animals long before individuality and democratic rights were invented.
More robust theories of liberalism can be derived from Popper and Hayek (The Constitution of Liberty and Law, Legislation and Liberty), rooted in the evolutionary perspective with social and cultural factors superimposed upon an instinctual base. It should be noted that humans were social or communal animals before they discovered or invented the human uses of language and philosophical notions about individuality and justice. The views of Popper and Hayek are not vulnerable to the attacks by the resurgent Platonists of the organic or communalist school who identify the Achilles heel of classical liberalism in the form of the so-called 'social atom' theory of the liberal Self. This attack is clearly articulated by Michael Sandel in his contribution to Liberalism and its Critics (Ed Sandel, Blackwell, 1984) Two features emerge from this book: First, the challenge is sustained by misreading or ignoring the Popper/Hayek case for liberalism, while minimal state liberals such as Nozick provide easy targets. Secondly, the deeper problem is the matter of justification of moral and political beliefs and the organic school does no better in clearing this hurdle than does the simple-minded 'social atom' school of liberals.
Popper made a valuable contribution to this debate with his critique of the notion that the truth is manifest to all decent and reasonable people who opened their eyes (or their mind) to the right authority. This critique is best understood in the historical context of attempts to sustain moral beliefs against the spectre of moral nihilism and anarchy. Traditionally beliefs of all kinds, whether of cognition or valuation, were justified by appeals to established authorities. The modern revolution shifted the locus of justification to the individual, either to the intellectual intuition of clear and distinct ideas (Descartes) or to the apprehension of pure sense data (Bacon and Locke). In each case the truth was supposed to be manifest for those people whose perceptions were unclouded by evil or the distraction of traditional prejudices.
This false epistemology was the major inspiration of an intellectual and moral revolution without parallel in history. It encouraged men to think for themselves. It gave them hope that through knowledge they might free themselves and others from servitude and misery. It made modern science possible. It became the basis of the fight against censorship and the suppression of free thought...It made men feel responsible for themselves and for others, and eager to improve not only their own condition but also that of their fellow men. It is a case of a bad idea inspiring many good ones. This false epistemology, however, has also led to disastrous consequences. The theory that truth is manifest - that it is there for everyone to see, if only he wants to see it - this theory is the basis of almost every kind of fanaticism. For only the most depraved wickedness can refuse to see the manifest truth; only those who have reason to fear truth conspire to suppress it. (From Popper's Introduction to Conjectures and Refutations, based on the lecture which inspired Bartley to formulate his solution to the problem of rationality).
These new authorities failed to provide indisputably justified belief and this precipitated the post-modern crisis of confidence in individualism, which opened the way for the resurgence of collectivist theories of moral legitimacy. This shift back to the supra-individual source of moral justification gained impetus from Hegel's revival of Platonic and Aristotelian themes. Individualism failed as a source of justification and the supra-individual theories fail on this account as well, throwing up yet again the problem of relativism and moral anarchy (or apathy). The answer is to take account of Bartley's work on rationality and the limits of criticism and to accept that there is no ultimate justification to be found. So instead of searching with mounting desperation for something that does not exist (like the Philosophers Stone and the perpetual motion machine) we can work on the basis of critical preferences (tentatively accepted in the light of evidence and arguments in hand) for moral theories and political programs which best solve their problems and stand up to criticism. Moral and political philosophy should not be concerned with essences and definitions, instead we should formulate and criticise standards which act as 'rules of the game' in social life, whether at the household level (how to share the chores) or at the level of the Constitution of the State (whether the budget should be balanced). This would cut through much of the verbalism that bogs down traditional discourse on morals and politics because it is constantly in touch with practical problems and their possible solutions.
